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What makes the issue of same-sex marriage so hard? Many
would deny the very premise of this question. Indeed, a prominent
journalist once assured me that there exists not a single respectable
argument against legal recognition of same·sex unions. Yet same-sex
marriage has failed to win approval, often by large margins, in every
state in which it has been put to a vote. Clearly, many voters do not
agree with my journalist friend.
It is not surprising that same-sex marriage generates such
extremes of opinion. Like abortion, same·sex marriage pits two
strongly-felt world views against one another. Important elements of
these disparate outlooks cannot be easily separated from matters of
faith and religious belief, although they are not uniformly dependent
on them.! The implications of this ideological divide go well beyond
defining marriage. It affects how people think about a range of
contentious questions, including sexuality, morality, privacy, family
form, parental authority, divorce, single parenthood, abortion, sex
education, pornography, and reproductive technology.
How can these disparate world views be characterized? Various
formulations are available both in scholarly and more popular
literature. In a recent column in the New York Times, David Brooks
drew a contrast between an expressive individualist and a socio+
ecological view of social life. 2 That distinction captures some of the
difference. But perhaps a better way to characterize the divide is
through the opposition between pluralism and traditional mores. To
summarize: pluralism is a cluster of ideas associated with the
embrace of diversity, choice, personal expression, autonomy, and
individual freedom. Traditionalists, in contrast, focus on social
ramifications of personal conduct and stress the importance of long-

. Robert Mundheim Professor of Law, Universit.y of Pennsylvania Law School. B.S.,
Yale University; M.D., Harvard Medical School; J.D., Columbia Law School.
1. See generally Amy L. Wax, The Conservative's Dilemma: Traditional
Institutions, Social Change, and Same·Sex Marriage, 42 SA.N" DIEGO L. REV. 1059
(2005).

2.

See David Brooks, A Tear in Our Fabric, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at AG.
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standing practices and restraints.3 Who advocates for these disparate
positions? The demography reflects our political divisions more
generally. Leading the pluralist camp are those, like my journalist
friend, who are members of the ''liberal intelligentsia"--coastal,
intellectual, secular, relatively well-educated, and often living and
socializing with other like-minded individuals in "blue states."
Typical traditionalists, in contrast, are conservative-leaning, often
deeply religious persons who cluster together in the heartland in 50called "red states." Each side has fellow travelers and hangers-on
who do not subscribe wholeheartedly to every ideological element,
but are roughly in sympathy with the overall view.
In important respects, the embrace of same-sex marriage
straddles the cultural divide. This makes the issue a hard one for
thoughtful people whose sympathies may lie predominantly with one
camp or the other. On the one hand, same-sex marriage is a novel
and revolutionary concept that requires the abandonment of eons of
traditional practice and understandings about a bedrock institution
of civilized societies. It entails the radical revision of a pivotal aspect
of marriage, with far-reaching consequences that can only be dimly
anticipated. On the other hand, same-sex marriage is marriage. As
such, those seeking legalization would seem to endorse many of the
values, traditions, understandings-and, one assumes, restraints,
constraints, limitations, and obligations-that have widely been
regarded as intrinsic to the institution of marriage as conventionally
practiced. This paradox has not gone unnoticed by proponents of
legalization. Indeed, some within the gay community have asked
whether pursuing the right to marry does not give too much to the
other side. 4 For many homosexuals, it does not make sense to fight
for the freedom to marry.5 Citing marriage's patriarchal history and
hostility to free and open expressions of sexuality, some gays argue
against legalization and for expanding access to marital privileges
outside the context of marriage.6 Claudia Card, for example, argues
that gays should press for the State to "deregulate heterosexual
marriage"7 rather than "to regulate homosexual marriage."8

3. See also KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GoES TO SCHOOL: WARRING VIEWS ON
SEX-AND SEX EDUCATION-SINCE THE SIXTIES (2006) (exploring a similar cultural
divide in the context of sex education in the schools).
4. See KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX NlARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF
LoVE AND LAw 78 (2006) (explaining that "[gJays and lesbians have been debating the
desirability and importance of same-sex marriage for years ...").

5.

ld.

6. Claudia Card, Against Marriage, in SA.l\fE SEX: DEBATING THE ETHICS,
SCIENCE, AND CULTURE OF HOMOSEXUALITY 317, 321 (John Corvino ed., 1997).
7. Id.
S. ld.
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There is, accordingly, tension between some of the "liberationist"
commitments held by gay (and heterosexual) proponents of same-sex
marriage legalization, and the commitments that legalization entails.
But this very tension also poses a challenge to traditionalists who are
fighting same-sex marriage. After all, the chief rival to marriage is
non-marriage in all its forms-from legally established domestic
partnerships (which approximate the benisons of matrimony) to an
extreme form of sexual and reproductive free agency that, in past
eras, marched under the rubric of "free love" and today is labeled
"polyamory."9 As the author Jonathan Rauch notes, an important
force threatening marriage in American society today is the tendency
of heterosexuals to flout or abandon it. 10 Perhaps extending marriage
to homosexuals will have the effect of shoring up that institution
rather than undermining or destroying it.
Although what is good for gays may be good for marriage, that is
not the only possible outcome. The alternative is that marriage (and,
by extension, society) will suffer if gays are permitted to enter into
the state of matrimony. The question of which prediction will prove
most accurate animates the debate and informs the case law on the
legality of same-sex marriage. As posed, the question takes for
granted that marriage is a social good and that marriage benefits
individuals-positions that, as noted! not all gays enthusiastically
embrace. But the proponents of same-sex marriage are willing to
grant this, at least for the sake of argument. Thus the filings by
plaintiffs in the same-sex marriage cases often end up being very promarriage briefs.
This Article seeks to examine the overall approach to social
institutions that underlies the debate on same-sex marriage as
revealed in judicial decisions-specifically of the New Jersey courts
(supreme and appellate division) in Lewis v. Harrisll and the ew
York Court of Appeals in Hernandez u. Roblesl2--that address
whether state constitutions protect gays' right to marry. After
defining the positions of pluralists and traditionalists, this Article
explores the key points of disagreement that characterize the
outlooks of advocates and opponents in these camps. It then
discusses how the opinions in the cases reflect and respond to these

9. See Elizabeth F. Emens, MOlWgamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHA.~GE 277 (2004-2005).
10.

JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GoOD FOR

STRAIGHTS, A.'lD GooD f'QR AMERICA 149-50 (2004).
11. 908 A.2d 196 (2006) (afrg in part and reu-g in part, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005».
12. 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (2006) (holding that "the New York Constitution does not
compel recognition of marriages between members of the same sex. Whether such
marriages should be recognized is a question to be addressed by the Legislature."').
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perspectives. In the final section, this Article seeks to evaluate the
opposing positions in light of data on demographic and social trends
of the past 50 years. It concludes by noting that, although recent
developments have vindicated the wisdom of many traditionalist
commitments and assumptions, pluralist priorities have nonetheless
become firmly entrenched in actual practice. In light of this, the fact
that same-sex marriage has failed to become established via the
judicial route may not impede reform in the long-term. Because
people arc increasingly ambivalent about traditionalist assumptions,
same-sex marriage is likely to be adopted in the future through the
democratic process.
Two VIEWS OF FAMILY: THE TRADITIONALIST VS. PLUR>\LIST DIVIDE

To most people, regardless of their position on gay marriage,
"[tJhe family is arguably the most important institution we have."13
Likewise, there is general agreement that we should not take what
happens to the family lightly. Disagreement arises, however, as to
what form of the family is best-for children, for adults, and for
society as a whole. This disagreement finds expression in disparate
views on the future of the family and the laws regulating it. In
particular, the divide is acute on the question of whether gay
marriage should be legalized.
This section attempts to characterize the two major competing
visions of marriage in the context of more general ideas about
sexuality, the individual, and the family's relationship to society as a
whole. This divide is complex, and there are potential alternative
ways to characterize it. For simplicity, I shall refer to the respective
positions as "traditionalist" and "pluralist."
In general, traditionalists believe that the family form that has
been most historlcally and socially respected and that has stood the
test of time-the biological, heterosexual "nuclear" family-should
occupy a privileged place today. This form should continue to be
regarded, in law and custom, as the ideal model for our society.14 The
pluralists, in contrast, insist that this view is too narrow and too
hierarchical. The pluralist vision finds expression in the notion that
individuals are free to choose how to construct their "family of

13. John Haskey, Families: Tlu!ir Historical Context, and Recent Trends in the
Factors influencing Their Formation and Dissolution, in THE F'RAGMEl\"TING FMHLY:
DOES ITMATIER? 9, 9 (Miriam E. David ed., 1998).

14. See. e.g.• Robert H. Knight, How Domestic Partnerships and "Gay Marriage"
Threaten the Family, in SAME·SEX: DEBATING THE ETHICS. SCIENCE, AND CULTURE m'
HOMOSEXUAUTY 289, 302 (John Corvino ed., 1997).
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cholce."15 Within a broad range of combinations, they ought not to be
restricted either by law or custom. A family, for example, can include
more people than merely those to whom one is biologically relatedand often does. 16 The existence of many alternative types of families
shows that there is no justification for privileging one family form
over another or for defining one type as the "ideal" to which all
should aspire. I1 Many chosen families have the potential to function
well.Is
Traditionalists and pluralists diverge on a few key points. First,
traditionalists tend to focus on the form the family takes and fmd
some forms more optimal than others. For example, two opposite-sex
parents raising their own biological children is regarded as the
best.19 Pluralists, on the other hand, are more concerned with family
functioning-the potential for a family to work well-when
determining whether or not a family should be regarded as
acceptable or successfu1. 2o Thus, a pluralist would look beyond the
structure of an unconventional family to the substantive interactions
and relationships between the members in determining whether the
family is good for children, adults, and society. By extension,
pluralists shy away from relying on generalizations, even if presently
empirically valid, about how some families actually perform relative
to others. What matters is the potential of a broad range of forms to
function weLL Instances of good families can be found in many types.
Similarly, the two camps differ in their views of the procreative
function of families. Traditionalists believe that the nuclear family
provides the best environment in which to raise children, while
pluralists see a range of family variants-such as those headed by
lesbian co-parents, or single mothers, or cohabiting couples-as
potentially just as good for children.
Traditionalists and pluralists also tend to stress different aspects
of relationships. For traditionalists, marriage's central purposes are
providing social stability, fostering commitment, and creating the
best setting for socializing children to constructive and dominant

15. See Graham Allan, &undaries of Friendship. in. FAMILIES IN SOCIETY:
BoUNDARIES & REL>\TIO:\"SHIPS 227. 227-31 (Linda McKie & Sarah CunninghamBurley eds.• Jo Campling consultant ed., 2005).
16. See. e.g., Iris Marion Young, Mothers, Citizenship and Independence: A Critique
of Pure Family Values. 105 ETHICS 535, 553 (1995).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Ron Crews, No Court Ruling Can Change the Fact that Marriage is
About One Man and One Woman, in Sk\IE:-SEX MARRL>\GE: TilE MORAL AND LEGAL
DEBATE 99, 100 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 2d cd. 2004).
20. See. e.g., Elizabeth B. Silva & Carol Smart, The "New'" Practices and Politics of
Family Life. in THE NEW FAMILY? I, 11 (Elizabeth B. Silva & Carol Smart eds., 1999).

382

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:2

norms. A pluralist might acknowledge that marriage can be about
those goods, but sees love, choice, individual fulfillment, and personal
happiness as equally important. Implicitly, the two camps diverge on
priorities when some of these values come into conflict. Pluralists tilt
towards assigning significant weight to individual priorities, whereas
traditionalists stress hewing to established duties and fulfilling welldefined responsibilities even at the cost of self-actualization. Finally,
the two sides differ in their approach to the recent ferment in family
life: traditionalists want to respond to actual behavioral and
demographic changes by restoring, advocating, and strengthening
the conventional institution of marriage, whereas pluralists want to
accept the changes and introduce policies that will support
alternative lifestyles and living arrangements.
These positions on the family resonate with deeper philosophical
and theoretical commitments-commitments that, in turn, have
broad implications for many aspects of social life. A respect for
tradition proceeds from particular ideas about human nature and the
key forces that preserve communities. First, traditionalists believe
that human beings are limited in virtue, because human nature often
inclines towards selfish and socially destructive choices.
Traditionalists embrace a "social ecology" view of customary
institutions such as marriage which· regards them as essential to a
workable social and moral order. By establishing expectations and
defining roles, these institutions promote virtue. They shape, guide,
and constrain human action towards socially constructive goals.
Such institutions are also necessary because individuals are
limited in knowledge and wisdom. They cannot rely wholly on their
own reasoning powers or individual insights to lead them towards
morally desirable behavior, especially in their relationships with
others. Rather, people do better by looking to age-old, well-tested
practices to guide their conduct towards socially beneficial goals. In
effect, institutions establish "scripts" that define basic duties and
provide transparent guidelines for behavior. These simple scripts
"maximize the chance that persons of limited intellect and selfcontrol will negotiate complex human interactions successfully."21
Pluralists de-emphasize the role of such restraints. Rather, they
assign paramount importance to personal fulfillment. They insist
upon the freedom to discover personal goals and pursue them. In
emphasizing self-determination and choice as the key to maximizing
social well-being, pluralists downplay the intellectual limitations and
evil inclinations that tend to make moral innovation destructive of
the social good. In that respect, pluralists appear to harbor a vision of
human nature as fundamentally benign and socially constructive.
21.

Wax, supra note 1, at 1090.
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Likewise, tradition deserves no special deference, because it is as
likely to thwart human happiness as to promote it. Breaking free of
customary practices may be necessary for people to achieve their full
potential and maximize weU·being. Scrutiny should therefore be
reserved for overly rigid norms and constraints, which can block or
distort beneficial choices.
Pluralism is increasingly dominant among the well-educated.
One source of its appeal is that it marshals key intellectual,
democratic, and liberal values-values to which our culture has long
been committed-to challenge settled practices in the area of
sexuality and family. The pluralist view is also popular among
intellectuals because it comports with a rationalist approach to social
life. Rationalists are suspicious of tradition. They are skeptical of the
notion, associated with conservative thinkers like Hayek and Burke,
that customary norms that emerge organically over time are likely to
be more beneficial than arrangements that are individually or
bureaucratically devised through a process of reason. Rationalists see
no basis for assuming that customs embody the collective wisdom of
mankind. Indeed, some students of norms point out that
longstanding traditions are as likely to be destructive and backward
as constructive and conducive to collective weU·being. They note that
many established rules and customs-such as slavery, or the legal
subordination of women-have now been discarded as irrational and
harmful. Because there is no guarantee that traditions are benign or
worth preserVIng, all entrenched practices must ultimately
withstand the test of reason. In answer to these concerns, most
traditionalists emphasize that they are not against all change.
Rationalists respond that this concession begs the question of how
social change is to come about if not by scrutinizing existing practices
in light of other commitments that transcend settled customs.
In pursuit of such scrutiny, pluralists point to key values and
priorities that are often at odds with customary ways. These include
personal rights, equality, non-discrimination, sexual privacy, and
personal autonomy. In the context of same-sex marriage, for
example, reserving marriage for heterosexual, opposite·sex couples
obviously "discriminates" against those who are excluded from this
category and treats them unequally. Likewise, the ban on
polygamy-or other unconventional marital combinations-also
grants privileges to some while denying them to others. Dismantling
this structure of exclusive privilege is unproblematic for those in the
pluralist camp committed to individualistic values. Once again,
pluralists harbor a strong assumption that pursuing these core
ideals, even in derogation of settled forms, will improve social life.
For traditionalists, elevating a list of abstract principles above
other concerns is misguided. It is not that the aforementioned ideals
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have no place in structuring social rules. Rather, their unrelenting,
exceptionless pursuit can lead to the demolition of institutions that,
in practice, are sorely needed to help ordinary people engage in
constructive action and make good decisions about their lives.
Sweeping away those institutions or altering them radically-both in
definition and in their day to day practice---may leave many people
without the guidance they need. This can result in decisions with
untoward consequences for adults, children, and society overall.
Because people have limited powers of understanding and intellect,
they cannot be expected to weigh all the costs and benefits that
might accrue from discarding accepted forms and striking out in new
directions. Indeed, many of the collective and long-term effects of
radical changes are hard to anticipate. And once these effects are felt,
they often cannot later be reversed.
Traditionalists are critical of the assumption that people are
autonomous and discrete individuals whose self-realization consists
in protecting freedom of action. Traditionalists fault this conception
as ignoring the destructive potential of unguided choice. Without the
restraints implicit in settled practices and customary guidelines, the
autonomous exercise of rights runs the risk of issuing in socially
destructive conduct. Rights must be balanced with the need to
channel decision-making and to preserve the integrity of practices
that protect us from others' self-regarding conduct.
How do pluralist and traditionalist views translate into thinking
about family forms? What are the implications for gay marriage in
particular? Traditionalists stress that marriage is a central
organizing institution, and one that is crucial to defining identities
and roles. Although not without flaws (as would be expected for any
arrangement among imperfect-and
non-perfectible--beings),
marriage has long served society well by providing a stable setting in
which individuals can conduct their social, sexual, and reproductive
lives. Most importantly, marriage creates a sheltered environment in
which children can be brought up and the values of society reliably
transm.itted to the next generation. Radical changes made to
marriage-or abandonment of that institution altogether in
significant numbers-leads to the loss of a defined "context" in which
to make myriad decisions affecting others. 22 Without marriage,
personal life proceeds without a "stable repository of meaning beyond
an elusive self."23 If it is ultimately up to the individual to decide
what constitutes appropriate behavior in intimate relations, it is

22. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Post modern Family Law: Toward a New Model of
Status, in PRO:,>USES To KEEP: DECLINI'; A.~D RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN A.~1ERICA 157
(David Popcnoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain & David Blankenhorn eds., 1996).
23.

[d.
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hard to know what principles should be used to construct the rules of
conduct. "Morality [is] to come from within, 'but the interior has no
structure."'24 Because there are no prescribed guidelines dictating
one's duties or defining proper behavior, it is hard to know how to
make good decisions. In turn, it is difficult to find a reason for
restraint or for turning away from one's momentary heart's desire,
however narrowly self-regarding. Nothing seems worthy of "the
foreclosure of possibility that intimate commitment necessarily
entails."25 In this way, a lack of prescription can lead to an ethic of
amorality, which runs a significant risk of inflicting harm on others.
Pluralists, for their part, would deny that they lack overarching
moral commitments. But the principles they appear to place at the
centerpiece of social life, and those that presumably will ensure its
perfection, are equal treatment and equal regard. Equal treatment
dictates that individuals and their families should have the chance to
realize their potential for happiness and success. That happiness
may be achieved in many types of families;26 "gay and lesbian
families, single parent families, blended families, nuclear families,
[and] extended families" all have equal potential to impart "family
values."27 In addition, there is no a priori basis for believing that any
one form of the family "constitutes the appropriate or normative
arrangement for reproduction, nurturance, socialization and
economic support."28 For this reason, to select and accord a privileged
place to anyone form is seen as "simply discrimination."29 Not only
do pluralists argue that elevating the nuclear family above others is
unwarranted discrimination, but they question whether the nuclear
or biological family is as "natural" as the traditionalists claim. 30
Different forms of family can be functional or dysfunctional,
depending on the circumstances, and none has an intrinsically
superior chance of doing their job well. Adequate social and financial

24. See Jane Lewis, THE END QIo' MARRIAGE?: INDIVlDUALISM A.N'D INTIMATE
RELATIONS 13·14 (2001) (citation omitted).
25. Regan, supra note 22, at 164.
26. See, e.g., Jeffrey Weeks et a1., Everyday Experiments: Narratives of NonHeterosexual Relationships, in THE NEW FAMILY'? 83, 87 (Elizabeth B. Silva & Carol
Smart eds., 1999).
27. Young, supra note 16, at 553.
28. Frank Furstenberg, Can Marriage Be Saved?, DISSENT, Summer 2005, at A2,
available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/artide!?article=217&print=1.
29. Young, supra note 16, at 553; see also Rauch, supra note 10, at 112.
30. Jacqueline Stevens, Methods of Adoption: Eliminating Genetic Privilege. in
ADOPTION MATTERS: PHILOSOPHICAL AND FEMINIST ESSAYS 68, 77 (Sally Haslanger &
Charlotte Witt eds" 2005) (stating that ". ,. the truth of the matter is that families
have never existed without a political society providing the rules for what counts as a
family, with patterns of endogamy and exogamy that vary across societies and within
the same society over time." (citation omitted»).
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have no place in structuring social rules. Rather, their unrelenting,
exceptionless pursuit can lead to the demolition of institutions that,
in practice, are sorely needed to help ordinary people engage in
constructive action and make good decisions about their lives.
Sweeping away those institutions or altering them radically-both in
definition and in their day to day practice-may leave many people
without the guidance they need. This can result in decisions with
untoward consequences for adults, children, and society overalL
Because people have limited powers of understanding and intellect,
they cannot be expected to weigh all the costs and benefits that
might accrue from discarding accepted forms and striking out in new
directions. Indeed, many of the collective and long-term effects of
radical changes are hard to anticipate. And once these effects aTe felt,
they often cannot later be reversed.
Traditionalists are critical of the assumption that people are
autonomous and discrete individuals whose self-realization consists
in protecting freedom of action. Traditionalists fault this conception
as ignoring the destructive potential of unguided choice. Without the
restraints implicit in settled practices and customary guidelines, the
autonomous exercise of rights runs the risk of issuing in socially
destructive conduct. Rights must be balanced with the need to
channel decision-making and to preserve the integrity of practices
that protect us from others' self-regarding conduct.
How do pluralist and traditionalist views translate into thinking
about family forms? What are the implications for gay marriage in
particular? Traditionalists stress that marriage is a central
organizing institution, and one that is crucial to defining identities
and roles. Although not without flaws (as would be expected for any
arrangement
among imperfect-and
non-perfectible-beings),
marriage has long served society well by providing a stable setting in
which individuals can conduct their social, sexual, and reproductive
lives. Most importantly, marriage creates a sheltered environment in
which children can be brought up and the values of society reliably
transmitted to the next generation. Radical changes made to
marnage-or abandonment of that institution altogether 111
significant numbers-leads to the loss of a defined "context" in whieh
to make myriad decisions affecting others.22 Without marriage,
personal life proceeds without a "stable repository of meaning beyond
an elusive sel£."23 If it is ultimately up to the individual to decide
what constitutes appropriate behavior in intimate relations, it is

22. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Postmodern Family Law: Toward a New Model of
Status, in PROMISES To KEEP: DBCLINE AND RENEWAl.. OF MARRLAGE IN AMERICA 157
(David Popenoe. Jean Bethke Elshtain & David Blankenhorn eds., 1996).
23. Id.
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support allows existing families to succeed even if they represent
alternatives to accepted forms; social disapproval and discrimination
are what undermine those disfavored arrangements and cause them
to fai1. Equal regard dictates that society take steps to enable all
types of families to reach their full potential. To this end, it is
important for society and the government to embrace, support, and
affirm many different family forms.
The traditionalist-pluralist divide finds expreSSIOn in
disagreements regarding the connection between adult relationships
and procreation. For traditionalists, children are front and center
and raising the next generation is the cardinal purpose of marriage.
Traditionalists also believe that married couples are most likely to
provide for children's proper socialization. In defending that
proposition, proponents stress the empirical findings of social science.
These show that "children raised in two-parent homes where both a
mother and a father are present grow up having better education,
fewer physical and mental health problems, and are less likely than
others to commit violent crimes as adults."31 Children raised by their
married biological parents are also "... significantly less likely to
suffer from depression, anxiety, alcohol and drug abuse, and
thoughts of suicide compared to children from divorced homes."32
They also tend to have more successful marriages themselves. 33 In
sum: "[m]arriage is associated with advantages to children at all
income and education levels."34
In explaining these findings, traditionalists note that marriage
shores up the weakest parental link: the tie between children and
their fathers. The law "traditionally presume[s) ... that a child born
to a married woman was fathered by her husband"35, and law and
custom assign married men responsibility for their children's support
and well-being. These conventions may account for why children are
more likely to receive a man's time, attention, and resources within a
31.

Crews, supra note 19, at 99-100.

32.

WITHERSPOON INST., MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES 16

(2006).

33. [d. at 20. But see A"lDREW J. CHERUN, MARRJAGE, DrvORCE, REMARRIAGE 77
(rev. and enlarged ed. 1992). "For example, [Sara] McLanahan and (Larry] Bumpass
report that in one national survey of women age 15 to 44, 25 percent of [those] who
had lived with only one natural parent at age 14 [had divorced], compared to about 14
percent among those who had lived with both parents, controlling for other factors."
Jd.

34. Martha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Should We? Could We? 38 (Brooklyn Law
Sch. Legal Studies Research Papers Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 43,
2005), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=829825.
35. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of 1'ransition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMPo L. 2101, 2103
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://papcrs.ssrn.comlabstract=898691.
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marital relationship.36 They also help explain why "[e]ven
cohabitating, biological fathers who live with their children are not
as involved and affectionate with their children as are married,
biological fathers who reside with their children."S7 Indeed, the best
available evidence to date suggests that children do best across a
range of indicators when they grow up in the home established by
their married, biological parents.. More specifically, the data show
that the conjunction of living with one's own biological parents and
those parents being continuously married to each other is the most
powerful predictor of children's success. As discussed more fully
below, recent research indicates that stepparent families are not as
stable or conducive to effective childrearing as intact, conventional
nuclear families. 38 Also, children in stepparent families do as poorly
as children in single parent families on some measures of outcome.
This suggests that, although marriage confers stability, simply
growing up in a marital household may not maximize benefits for
children. Some marital settings may be better than others.
For pluralists, successful childrearing is important. However, it
is just one of many equally compelling goals for families. Family
relationships exist to provide support, security, companionship, selffulfillment, and pleasure for all family members.39 Pluralists are
suspicious of the essentialism express~d by the stress on biological
connection. For them, a range of family types, representing different
36. Milton C. Regan Jr., Between Justice and Commitment, in JuST MARRB.GE 67,
69 (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004); see also WITHERSPOON INST., supra note 32, at 12
("Specifically, the married family satisfies children's need to know their biological
origins, connects them to both a mother and a father, establishes a framework of love
for nurturing the young, oversees their education and personal development, and
anchors their identity as they learn to move about the larger world.').
37. INST. FOI~ A.M. VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATIERS: TwENTY· SIX CONCLUSIONS
FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 12 (2d ed. 2005) (citation omitted). Similarly, Kathleen
Kiernan explains that:
[e]vidence is accruing which suggests that there are some differences
between marital and eohabitating unions. For example, cohabitating unions
are less stable and when these unions break up fathers of children born
outside marriage may be less involved with their children on dimensions
such as paying child support., visiting their children, and being involved in
child rearing decisions than are fathers whose children were born within
marriage.
Katherine Kiernan, Family Change: /SSUl!S and Implications, in. THE FRAmiENTING
FA.\'IILY: Dm::s IT MATTER? 51, 55 (Miriam E. David ed., 1998).
38. See infra pp. 402-04.
39. See, e.g., AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS xv (2002) (claiming that "... in this diverse society,
the achievement of fairness differs depending on the individuals, their choices, and
their expectations); Hull, supra note 4, at 215 (arguing that if the law recognized
other important relationships besides marriage, "... people will have more flexibility
to match their actual relationship and legal needs to state offerings").
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combinations of association, have the potential to function as well as
conventional families under the right circumstances. Families based
on kinship are not inherently superior to "chosen" associations based
on affinity and commitment. There is no reason why a man cannot be
as devoted to a child outside of marriage as within, and indeed no
reason why a non-biological "parent" cannot function as well as a
biological one. To the extent that social science data suggest
otherwise, pluralists view existing patterns as "constructed" and thus
contingent. Observed trends are amenable to modification through
more generous or more propitious policies. In effect, there is nothing
inherent to traditional forms that make them more likely to succeed.
Pluralists' position on family form and childrearing would thus
seem to entail a questioning of basing social policy and law on
observed generalizations, even if those are empirically valid at the
moment. In effect, pluralists resist prejudging relationships based on
statistical patterns. One point pluralists often make is that there are
plenty of unconventional families-such as single parent, or gay
parent families-that do a good job raising children. Moreover,
plenty of conventional families do poorly. Implicit in this observation
is that the overall statistical likelihood of one family type doing
better is not necessarily dispositive of what law or policy should
permit. In the case of gays, proponents deny that the data indicates
that children in gay parent families do worse.40 But, apart from that,
the position more generally seems to be that there is no inherent
reason why any particular non-traditional family cannot do a good
job. Certainly a proper respect for rights and autonomy demands that
families not be pre·judged based on generalizations from data. Each
person or family should be given an equal opportunity to prove its
bona fides and to function well.
THE CASES: PLURALIST OR TRADITIONALIST?

The split between traditionalist and pluralist views runs deep.
These perspectives embody disparate visions of human nature, the
role of biology, the nature of morality, the social arrangements
cpnducive to desirable conduct, and even the very definition of
morality itself. Are these broad philosophies evident in the two state
same-sex marriage cases under consideration? Both cases-Lewis v.
Harris in New Jersey and Hernandez v. Robles in New York-resolve
challenges under their respective state constitutions to the law's
failure to allow same-sex couples to marry. Although using different
formulations, both courts assess these challenges under a rougWy
similar standard: the legislature need merely supply some kind of
plausible reason for creating an inequality of treatment for
40.

See in.fra p. 407.
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homosexual and heterosexual couples. In declaring that the
restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples must advance a
legitimate government purpose, the majority in Hernandez applied
something like rational basis review.41 The Hernandez majority
found that such a purpose existed: restricting marriage to oppositesex couples promotes and protects the welfare of children. 42 Marriage
law serves the legitimate purpose of channeling heterosexuals
toward behaviors that enhance domestic stability. For its part, the
few Jersey Supreme Court in Lewis v. Harris stated the
requirement that the restriction bear "a substantial relationship to a
legitimate governmental purpose."43 In contrast with the New York
Court of Appeals, the ew Jersey Supreme Court majority found no
justification for conferring unequal substantive rights and privileges
on same-sex and opposite-sex couples. The court nonetheless found a
restriction on the category of marriage itself acceptable on the same
standard, albeit with little explanation as to why maintaining this
structure served a rational state purpose.
Both decisions have in common the courts' refusal to find a
constitutional basis for invalidating legal definitions that restrict
marriage to opposite-sex relationships. Neither court viewed the
imperatives of equal treatment or the jurisprudence of fundamental
rights as requiring the state to make· marriage available to gay
couples. Beyond that, however, the courts' emphasis and reasoning
differ dramatically. The Hernandez court did not find problematic the
differential treatment entailed by the law's exclusion of gay couples
from the institution of marriage_ In contrast, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found objectionable the legal denial of "rights and
benefits to committed same-sex couples that are statutorily given to
their heterosexual counterparts."44 Although the Lewis court
majority relied on a fundamental rights analysis to hold that the
legislature was not required to expand the designation of "marriage",
it nonetheless held that substantive distinctions must be eliminated
from the state law of domestic relations. 45 Regardless of what the
legislature chose to call them, the relationships open to gay couples
must be indistinguishable in all practical respects from those into
which opposite-sex couples were permitted to enter. 46

855 N.E.2d at 12.
Jd. at 11·12.
908 A.2d. at 212.
Id. at 200.
45. Jd. at 217 ("Unequal dispensation of rights and benefits to committed same-sex
partners can no longer be tolerated under our State Constitution.").
46. [d. at 224. The court concluded that:
[D]enying to committed same· sex couples. the financial and social benefits
and privileges given to their married heterosexual counterparts bears no
41.
42.
43.
44.
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These decisions can be viewed as presenting the question of
whether the state constitutions themselves embody a pluralist or
traditionalist approach to sexual mores. At first blush, it would seem
that the documents do not take sides. There are aspects of the
language and reasoning in both cases that embrace neutrality. In
stating that "of course the Legislature may ... extend marriage or
some or all of its benefits to same-sex couples,"47 the Hernandez court
appears to take the position that the constitution mandates no
particular set of values or judgments on how the law should
configure marital relations. Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court
majority in Lewis made clear its view that a legislative decision to
change the law to permit same-sex marriage would easily square
with the state constitution.48 Indeed, in requiring the legislature to
change the state's law to conform to its "equality" mandate, the state
supreme court recognized that one way (although not the only way)
to fulfill that command would be to extend to gays the right to
marry.49
In sum, both courts seem to agree that, if the New York or New
Jersey legislature decided to recognize same-sex marriage, nothing in
the state constitutional order would stand in the way. On the other
hand, neither court was willing to require that recognition. Both
courts' refusal to mandate gay marriage, while acknowledging the
legislature's freedom to permit it, would appear consistent with
constitutional "neutrality." It could be claimed that neither court
formally takes sides between the pluralist and traditionalist
approaches to sexuality, marriage, and family. Such neutrality finds
expression in the institutional allocation implicit in both decisions.
Judges should leave to the legislature, the people's duly elected
representatives, the task of mediating between competing views of
marriage advocated by the factions in the culture wars.
Further reflection reveals, however, that the neutrality in Lewis
is superficial at best. Although Lewis pays lip service to legislative
authority over the definition of marriage, the court's equality
command drains that authority of all but purely symbolic
significance. In actual practice, if not in name, the Lewis court's
ruling necessarily embraces basic pluralist assumptions about the
role and place of families in social life. Conversely, the court
substantial relationship to a legitimate public purpose. We now hold that
under the equal protection guarantee ... of the New Jersey Constitution,
committed same·sex couples must be afforded on equal terms the same
rights and benefits enjoyed by married opposite·sex couples.
[d. at 220-21.
47. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.
48. See 908 A.2d. at 221-22.
49.

[d.
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implicitly rejects traditionalist justifications for conferring on
heterosexual relationships special rights and privileges.
A closer look at the court's analysis is revealing. In considering
the plaintiffs' interests in equal treatment and non-discrimination
toward their choice of family type, the New Jersey Supreme Court
notes that "legislation, in distinguishing between two classes of
people, [must] bear a substantial relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose."so The court asserts that, despite an extensive
body of New Jersey law that prevents "discriminat[ionl ... on the
basis of sexual orientation,"si the state's laws "continue to restrict
committed same-sex couples from enjoying the full benefits and
privileges available through marriage."52 The court then considers
how the State might justify those restrictions and whether they can
be said to advance a "legitimate governmental purpose." Here the
court comes up virtually empty-handed. It concludes that "[o]ther
than sustaining the traditional definition of marriage ... the State
has not articulated any legitimate public need for depriving same-sex
couples of the host of benefits and privileges" given to married
couples. 53 Accordingly, it concludes that there is "no rational basis" to
deny same-sex couples those rights and benefits. 54 In contrast, the
Hernandez majority accepts at least the potential validity of a
traditionalist account of family life. Without actively advocating the
traditionalist approach, the Hernandez majority acknowledges the
basic reasonableness of traditionalism's core commitments. In
particular, the Hernandez majority acknowledges that marriage can
be a useful device for channeling behavior and protecting children's
interest in domestic stability.55
Although advocates of gay marriage in Lewis did not get
precisely what they were seeking, the decision represents a giant
leap forward for their position and for a pluralist vision of the family.
Most pluralists deny it is incumbent on states to recognize
matrimony at all. 56 But having created that institution, the State
50. [d. at 212. As the court states, it must "weighO ... three factors" to make this
determination: "the nature of the right at stake, the extent to which the challenged
statutory scheme restricts that right, and the public need for the statutory restriction."
Id. Furthermore, the court explains, "'the more personal the right, the greater the
public need must be to justify governmental interference with the exercise of that
right.'" [d. (citation omitted).
51. [d. at 212-13. Examples cited by the court include New Jersey laws
surrounding "parental visitation rights of a divorced homosexual father," the law of
"domestic partnership," and the Law Against Discrimination. Id.
52. ld. at 215.
53. [d. at 217.
54. ld.
55. 855 N.E.2d at 6-7.
56. ld. at 217-18.
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cannot plausibly justify restrictions on the types of relationships that
can be accorded privileges and protections associated with marriage.
To be sure, the ew Jersey Supreme Court's decision is, on the
surface, a curious amalgam of traditional and pluralist elements.
Importantly, the court did not mandate a right to marry. This aspect
of the decision is based on the court's refusal to recognize the right of
same-sex marriage as a "fundamental right" rooted in history and
tradition. In effect, the court imports traditional categories and
understandings into the analysis of whether the right to marry
satisfies the standard for a "fundamental right." It is not surprising,
then, that traditionalism wins the day on this narrow question of
whether the State must label these rights and benefits "marriage."
But the practical reach of the "fundamental rights" analysis is
virtually non-existent. The requirement of equal treatment has the
curious effect of draining marriage of its substantive significance. It
reserves marriage to heterosexual couples as little more than a label
or rubric for their relationship. In this respect, traditionalism (with
legislative discretion to operate on traditionalist assumptions)
triumphs-literally-in name only. The footprint of traditionalism is
so small as to virtually disappear.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's approach to the core concerns
of traditionalism, and its analysis of the possible basis for reserving
special rights and privileges to opposite-sex couples, stands in stark
contrast to the approach taken by the majority in the New Jersey
Appellate Division decision under review. Unlike the supreme court,
the appellate court left undisturbed the substantive distinctions
between the rights conferred on same-sex and opposite-sex couples
that were embodied in the state law of domestic relations. 57 Like the
New York Court of Appeals in Hernandez, the appellate division in
Lewis gave serious consideration to the traditionalist argument that
the best environment for children is the nuclear family.58 Judge
Parrillo's concurring opinion, in particular, is perhaps most explicit
on the contrast between pluralist and traditionalist visions of this
priority. In discussing the Massachusetts Goodridge v. Dep't of Public
Health59 case (in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck
down the restriction of marriage in Massachusetts to opposite-sex
couples), Judge Parrillo acknowledges that plaintiffs' claims there-

57.

58.

Lewis, 875 A.2d 259.
See id. at 267.

[M]arriage is so clearly related to the public interest in affording a favorable
environment for the growth of children that we are unable to say that there
is not a rational basis upon which the state may limit the protection of its
marriage laws to the legal union of one man and one woman.
Id. (quoting Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974».
59. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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and in New Jersey-rely on equality and liberty jurisprudence
"couched in the more recent terminology of privacy, autonomy, and
identity."60 He expressly identifies the "close personal relationship
model of marriage" as the one espoused and triumphant in the
Goodridge case. 61 He draws a contrast between that view and a
concept that has "traditionally ... embraced so much rnore."62
According to Parrillo, this richer conception encompasses an
awareness of:
[T]he fact of sexual difference; the enormous tide of
heterosexual desire in human life, the massive significance of
male female bonding in human life; the procreativity of
heterosexual bonding, the unique social ecology of heterosexual
parenting which bonds children to their biological parents, and
the rich genealogical nature of heterosexual family ties.63

Describing marriage as a "privileged state," Parrillo's discussion
implies that the privilege is grounded in the momentous public
consequences of opposite-sex relationships' procreative potential-a
potential that same-sex relationships notably lack. 64 In general,
Parrillo's description of conventional marrIage expresses an
"ecological," social-regulatory notion of the institution that comports
well with the traditionalist position.65 His opinion embodies a deeper
neutrality than that advanced by the New Jersey Supreme Court
majority. According to his view, the legislature could choose to adopt
traditionalist norms and reject pluralist understandings. For him, it
is not the place of the court to second-guess the legislature by making
a choice between these visions. Unlike the supreme court majority,
he is willing to accept that the traditionalist approach has some
plausibility. That outlook cannot be said to be wholly unjustified.
Nor, by implication, is it inconsistent with prior law.66
Parrillo's expression of the traditionalist view of marriage is
echoed by the opinions-majority and concurring-in Hernandez u.
Robles. With the concern to identify a rational basis for restricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples, the New York Court of Appeals, as
already noted, focused on the legislative purpose of promoting the
welfare of children. 57 But in explicating how the restriction advances
that purpose, the court took a deferential stance. It stated that the
Lewis, 875 A.2d at 295.
[d.
ld. at 276
63. [d. (quoting Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J
FAM. L. 11,81 (2004) (citation omitted»).
64. ld.
65. See id.
66. See discussion, infra. p. 394.
67. 855 N.E.2d at 11-12.
60.

61.
62.
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legislature is permitted to decide that "it is more important to
promote stability. and to avoid instability, in opposite·sex than in
same-sex relationships."68 In recognizing that fostering stability of
procreative relationships is a valid and vital objective in the area of
domestic relations, the opinion alluded more than once to a critical
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples: only for
heterosexuals can their "prefer[red type] ... of sexual activity ...
lead to the birth of children.".. The Hernandez court's
acknowledgment of the potential significance of the ineluctable
biological and procreative differences between same-sex and
opposite-sex unions contrasts with the limited deference that court
gives to the social science evidence plaintiffs adduced to shore up
their case. That evidence consisted of the limited studies to date on
homosexual childrearing, which have so far failed to show that
heterosexual families are better for children than same-sex
families.7o Despite the paucity of pro-traditionalist data on this point,
the Hernandez court refused to characterize customary restrictions
as "irrational, ignorant or bigoted."ll Relying on the long provenance
and near-universal acceptance of conventional marriage, it noted
that "{i]n the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the
Legislature could rationally proceed on the common-sense premise
that children will do best with a mother and father in the home.""
The court's opinion went further than just accepting that
stabilizing potentially
procreative-that is,
heterosexualrelationships was an important goal. The court left open the
possibility that abandoning opposite-sex exclusivity and putting
homosexual relationships on a par with marriage (in status or in
substance) might somehow undermine heterosexual marriage.73 One
of the significant weaknesses of the opinion is the failure to explain
how this might occur. Judge Graffeo, in concurrence, tried harder on
this point, although not with complete success. She states that "the
current definition of marriage is rationally related to the State's
legitimate interest in channeling opposite-sex relationships into

68.

Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.
Td.atl1.
70. As the Hernandez majority explains,
(pJlaintiffs, and amici supporting them, argue that the proposition asserted
is simply untrue: that a home with two parents of different sexes has no
advantage, from the point of view of raising children, over a home with two
parents of the same sex. Perhaps they are right, but the Legislature could
rationally think otherwise.
[d. at 7.
71. [d. at 8.
69.

72.
73.

Td.
[d.

TRADITIONALISM AND PLURALISM

2007]

395

marriage because of the natural propensity of sexual contact between
opposite-sex couples to result in pregnancy and childbirth."74 Beyond
that, her opinion says nothing about how the channeling function
actually works and how excluding homosexuals strengthens that
function. Rather, the connection is more or less assumed.
In Lewis u. Harris, the New Jersey Supreme Court does not so
much take on this position as disregard it. 15 On review of the
appellate decision, the court sidestepped the question of whether
differences in procreative potential and success-whether biological
or social-justify different legal treatment of same-sex and oppositesex couples. In refusing even to consider such arguments, the court
followed the lead of the New Jersey Attorney General's office, which
repudiated any reliance at the supreme court stage on a state
interest in fostering the well· being of children or in promoting the
formation of families most conducive to children's welfare. As the
appellate division majority acknowledged, "[t}he State concedes that
state law and policy do not support the argument that limiting
marriage to heterosexual couples is necessary for ... providing the
optimal environment for raising children."76 In taking this position,
the court appeared to endorse the view that any derogation of
homosexuals' qualifications to serve as parents was indeed in tension
with prior state law and judicial decisions concerning parental rights,
custody, and adoption. The court noted that state law had been
converging towards equality of treatment in these areas regardless of
sexual orientation. 77 The court pointed to its acknowledgment in past
decisions "that a woman can be the 'psychological parent' of children
born to her former same-sex partner during their committed
relationship, entitling the woman to visitation with the children."78
This and like decisions, the court suggested, deprived the State of a
key traditionalist rationale for preserving marriage: that standard
nuclear families should receive special sanction and protection as the
best setting for rearing children. Based on these past precedents, the
ew Jersey Supreme Court concluded that "[o]ther than sustaining
the traditional definition of marriage, which is not implicated in this
discussion, the State has not articulated any legitimate public need
for depriving same-sex couples of the host of benefits and privileges
[earlier} catalogued.... "79
74.
75.

Jd. at 21.

76.
77.

Id.
fd. at 212-13.

908 A.2d at 205-06.

78. Jd. at 213 (quoting V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (2000»; see also AM. LAWINST.,
supra note 39, at 5, 12 (describing different categories of parents such as '"de facto
parents" and '"parents by estoppelj.
79. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 217.
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In placing the arguments based on procreative interests off

limits the court appeared to embrace defining pluralist tenets.
Family function-not family form-matters most to child well-being.
Widely divergent types of families have the potential to function well.
Indeed, the court seemed to view these precedents as tilting strongly
against recognizing any state law distinctions related to parent-child
relations on the basis of sexual orientation. That is, the court
appeared to see those cases as conclusively establishing the lack of
any valid basis for preferring heterosexual, or opposite-sex couple,
homes as a setting for childrearing. On this view, the State must
officially recognize same-sex and opposite-sex families as equally
capable of providing a healthy and nurturing environment for
children.
The court's assessment that this conclusion followed closely from
prior precedents is understandable. The individualist and pluralist
orientation of past decisions on parent-child relations creates a
doctrinal force field that militates against the distinctions necessary
to preserve a privileged status for opposite-sex relationships. Yet,
here are good reasons to treat these two areas of domestic law
differently. Indeed, ew Jersey's approach to the law of parent-child
relations is not inconsistent with a more traditional paradigm for the
law as applied to relations between adults. Rules that allow a broad
range of people to adopt, or that recognize and protect the parental
rights of gays, can be justified as an accommodation to child wellbeing and the exigencies entailed by less than ideal circumstances.
The law of parent-child relations often develops in the wake of
relationship failures. Either the child's original family has dissolved
through divorce or a breakup, or the parents never married at all (in
some instances because they are in same*sex relationships). In those
cases, the government is there to pick up the pieces. The State's
priority must be to do what is best for the child under circumstances
that, by definition, fall short of the ideal. It makes sense to adopt the
position that flexible, pragmatic principles of "damage control"
should govern. Having some parent is better than having no parent.
Cutting a child off from someone who has effectively cared for himregardless of whether that person fits neatly into a pre-defined
category-may not represent the best accommodation to a messy
reality and can often prove harmful to the child. A child-oriented
approach means that children will often be placed in a setting that
the State might not wish to foster in the first instance but that
nonetheless represents the best available option.
The decision to adopt flexible rules that protect children on a
case*by-case basis does not necessarily entail a commitment to
enshrining adults' prerogatives to form the relationships they favor,
nor does it dictate the enforcement of strict equality between same-
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sex and opposite·sex couples. The New Jersey Supreme Court erred
in failing to see that a body of law developed to protect children in
"second best" cases provides little guidance on how the State should
shape the law to encourage "first best" relationships for childrearing.
Salvaging bad situations-which is the business of child-parent
relations law-does not mandate that the State reject the
traditionalist ideal. That ideal dictates that the State should not
encourage the initial creation of families that are, on average, less
than optimal. Yet the appearance of such families in greater numbers
is the expected consequence of giving equal legal rights to same-sex
couple partnerships.
In failing to make the distinction between ordering parent-child
relations and relationships between adults, the court rejected the
view that sanctioning a more liberal law of couple relations might
harm children in the long run. Its position was also aided by an
individualist focus on the harms allegedly suffered by specific
children now living in unconventional households. The court alluded
to the "social benefits and privileges available to children in
heterosexual households" that are "denied" to children of same-sex
couples. so The court noted that the law's restrictions lead children in
same-sex families to suffer "the economic and financial inequities
that are borne by same-sex domestic partners,"Sl despite "hav[ing]
the same universal needs and wants, whether they are raised in a
same-sex or opposite-sex family ...."S2 The court concluded that, if
the objective is to give all children maximum security, then "[t]o the
extent that families are strengthened by encouraging monogamous
relationships, whether heterosexual or homosexual, we cannot
discern any public need that would justify the legal disabilities that
now afflict same-sex domestic partnet·ships."S3
In concluding that conferring the full panoply of rights on gay
unions would be best for children growing up in those homes and
that withholding those rights would harm them, the court shares a
dominant pluralist concern with the fate of children currently being
80. [d. at 218.
81. [d. at 216. The court noted that:
[t]he Act [extant Domestic Partnership Actl provides no comparable
presumption of dual parentage to the non-biological parent of a child born to
a domestic partner ... As a result, domestic partners must rely on costly and
time-consuming second-parent adoption procedures. The Act also is silent on
critical issues relating to custody, visitation, and partner and child support
in the event a domestic partnership terminates.
[d. (citation omitted). ln addition, they go on, "... the Act does not place any support
obligation on the non-biological partner-parent who does not adopt a child born during
a committed relationship." Id.
82. [d. at216-17.
83. fd. at 218.
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raised m unconventional families. 84 More broadly, the court
implicitly distances itself from the traditionalist position that
children's interests are best vindicated by maintaining institutional
standards regardless of whether some people fall short of them. For
the traditionalist, it is more important-and ultimately better for
society-to maintain the clear message sent by holding up "best
practice" than to assist the people who deviate from it. The hope is
that strong institutions will influence more people to choose the
forms that redound over time to everyone's benefit. In failing to give
credence to this position and in focusing on the children already
living in same·sex families, the court is more in line with the
pluralist position than with traditionalism.
The court's rhetoric is also in keeping with a key, related
pluralist stance that an evolution towards more diverse family forms
is an inevitable feature of the social landscape. In reviewing the
expanding rights of homosexuals,86 noting that "[t]imes and attitudes
have changed," and construing past decisions as expressing "a
developing understanding that discrimination against gays and
lesbians is no longer acceptable,"86 the court acknowledges how social
practices have shifted and implies that such changes will continue.
The court also explains how time has altered even traditional
marriage: "[t]he institution of marriage reflects society's changing
social mores and values. In the last two centuries, that institution
has undergone a great transformation .... "87 The emphasis on
change and its inevitability echoes pluralist arguments that
resistance to these innovations is not only counterproductive but
futile. Emblematic of this position is the work of the sociologist
Stephanie Coontz, who argues that "[w]e may personally like or
dislike all of these changes [in family form and practice]. But there is
a certain inevitability about most of them."88 Despite its expressed
recognition that social institutions will inevitably undergo
modifications, the Lewis court nonetheless stops short of viewing this
dynamism as mandating a legal recognition of homosexual marriage.
Rather, according to the court, "the issue is not about the
84. See, e.g., JUDITH STACEY, TN THE NA.~E OF THE J:o"'AMILY: RETHINKING FA,.\ULY
VALUES IN THE POST MODERN AGE 135 (1996) (describing the way that these children
"... risk losing a beloved parent or co-parent at the whim of a judge"); EVAN WOLFSON,
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY AND GAY PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO MARRy 96
(2004) (describing how these children u are deprived of protection in the case of death,
disability, divorce. or other life·changing events.·').
85. See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 214-15.
86. See id. at 209 (citation omitted).
87. [d. at 223.
88. STEPHANIE COO:ITZ, MARRIAGE, A HlsroRY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTL)"lACY OR
How LoVE CONQUERED :MARRIAGE 280 (2005); see also STACEY, supra note 69, at. 37
(stating that "we do not have the option of returning ... even if we truly wanted to.").
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transformation of the traditional definition of marriage, but about
the unequal dispensation of benefits and privileges to one of two
similarly situated classes of people."89 It is substantive equality. not
the right to marry as such, that represents the appropriate
accommodation to changes-legal, social, and institutional-that
have already occurred.
In sum, in refusing to recognize that fostering the stability of
relationships is a valid and vital objective in the area of domestic
relations, the Lewis v. Harris opinion resoundingly rejects a
traditionalist view of potentially procreative partnerships.90 Unlike
the New York court in Hernandez9 1 , the Lewis court refuses to accept
that conferring rights on homosexual relationsh.ips could ever
undermine the stability of heterosexual marriage. 92 The New Jersey
Supreme Court's preoccupation is almost entirely with substantive
equality for gays and for gay couples-a view that assigns priority to
individual rights, autonomy, and equality of treatment. Children
have a place in the opinion only as innocent dependents already
ensconced in unconventional families. The court's paramount
objective is to avoid harming those existing children and to save
them from the detriments of unequal treatment. Broader ecological
or systematic factors-such as the effects on future children of
putting innovative relationships on a· par with others-are beyond
the scope of concern. In this respect, the court's opinion gives little
weight to traditionalist conceptions of the heuristic, normative
dynamics of familial forms.
PLURALIST VS. TRADITIONALIST FAMILIES: WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE?
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One criticism leveled against the embrace of tradition-and of
traditional family forms-is that it is unscientific. Progressive social
movements are allied with modern science in demanding evidence
that settled arrangements--especially as these force some
individuals to sacrifice benefits or privileges enjoyed by others-are
superior to proposed reforms. 93 The lower court opinions in Lewis u.
Harris actively question the claim that excluding same-sex couples
from the privileges enjoyed by opposite-sex couples will redound to
the benefit of children. 94 The Hernandez dissent also notes the lack of
obvious connection between barring homosexuals from marriage and
encouraging heterosexuals to marry or to confine procreation to that

89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Lewis. 908 A.2d at 217.
Id.
&e855 N.E.2d at 12.
908A.2dat217.
See, e.g., Wax, supra note 1, at 1082.
See 875 A. 2d 259, 264.
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setting. 95 In asking those who resist same-sex marriage to spell out
the exact causal chain that links rights for gay couples to the
weakening or destruction of marriage, some of the opinions in Lewis
and Hernandez refuse to take for granted a traditionalist assumption
that conventions and individual conduct are effectively intertwined.
Chief Justice Kaye's dissent in Hernandez, for instance, although
conceding that "encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry before
they have children is certainly a legitimate interest of the State,"
concludes that "the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from marriage
in no way furthers this interest."96 In observing that "there are
enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone," Chief Justice
Kaye implicitly faults the lack of demonstrable connection between
homosexuals' inability to marry and heterosexuals' behavior.97
Conservative traditionalists, in contrast, resist demands that
existing institutions justify themselves by adducing empirical
evidence of claimed benefits. The notion that fundamental revisions
in modes of living, by altering social expectations, norms, and roles,
will affect behavior in the long run is regarded as obviously true or at
least plausible enough to counsel caution. In answer to the objection
that barring homosexuals from marriage seems to have little to do
with whether heterosexuals enter that state, traditionalists would
point to how conduct is mediated by social meanings and
understandings. The fear is that, if the institution of marriage is
reshaped to give priority to diversity, choice, and individual
prerogatives-and if marital roles are redefined to fit different
homosexual and heterosexual lifestyles-then behavior surrounding
all marital relations may change in response. Those changes may not
be beneficial. For example, if homosexuals are less likely to have
children, procreation might become less central to marriage. This
might foster a model of marriage that views children as optional or
even unimportant. Or, in keeping with past commitments and
rhetoric, homosexual couples might place less emphasis on sexual
fidelity or be more tolerant of sexual infidelity within their
relationships.98 The existence of a significant number of "open
95. See 855 N.E.2d at 23 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
96. [d. at 30.
97. Id. As Chief Justice Kaye explains,
[oJf course, there are many ways in which the government could rationally
promote procreation-for example, by giving tax breaks to couples who have
children, subsidizing child care for those couples, or mandating generous
family leave for parents. Any of these benefits-and many more-might
convince people who would not otherwise have children to do so. But no one
rationally decides to have children because gays and lesbians are excluded
from marriage.
[d. at 31.
98. See Wax, supra note 1, at 1088.
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marriage" homosexual couples might affect how heterosexuals view
their own commitments, with potentially unsettling or disruptive
consequences. These projections are based on assumptions of how
normative dynamics function within social life rather than on actual
empirical observation or scientific data. It is not surprising that, in
keeping with its pluralist outlook, the lew Jersey Supreme Court in
Lewis u. Harris gives little credence to these types of arguments.99
By definition, traditionalist projections on the consequences of
equality for same-sex relationships cannot be backed by data, since
the proposed changes have not yet occurred-at least not on the large
scale that proponents advocate. For traditionalists, this creates a
dilemma. Those who resist change will rarely be able to answer the
call for hard evidence of the detrimental effects that elicit their
apprehensions. Given current rationalist demands, traditionalist
efforts to slow social innovation threatens to be a losing battle.
But all is not lost yet. First, despite elite opinion strongly in
favor of same-sex marriage, voters have staunchly resisted attempts
to legalize these relationships. There is also a growing body of
demographic data that, although far from definitive on the question
of the functioning of same-sex families, provides cause for concern.
Although the evidence to date may not suffice to \vin the day against
legalization, it flags issues and sets priorities for more research. It
remains to be seen whether future social science studies will validate
or dispel popular reservations about the creation of new types of
f2milies on a wide scale.
In investigating the effects of family structure on outcomes for
children, social scientists have accumulated impressive evidence that
"[fjrom the standpoint of
economic well-being and sound
psychological development
the intact two-parent family IS
generally preferable to the available alternatives."lOo Much
demographic investigation has focused on the effects of single parent
families, which have greatly increased in number through extramarital childbearing and divorce. It is now well-accepted that, even
controlling for factors like income and parental education, children
growing up with two parents do significantly better on a range of
social indicators than children living with one parent.lOI In seeking to

99.

See 908 A.2d at 209.

WILLlAM GALSTON, POUTICAL LIBERALlSM 284 (1991); see, e.g., Marcia J.
Carlson & Mary E. Corcoran, Family Structure and Children's Behavioral and
Cognitive Outcomes, 63 J. Mi\RRIAGE & THE FAMILY 779 (2001); JA.'l PRYOR & BRIAN
RODGERS, CHILDREN IN CHANGING FAMILIES: LIFE AFTER PARE~'TAL SEPARATION
(2001).
101. Sara S. McLanahan & Lynn Casper, Growing Diversity and Inequality in the
American Family, in STATE OF THE UNiON: AMERICA IN THE 1990's 1,20-21 (Reynolds
100.

Farley ed., 1995).
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refine these observations and discover the secret of the two-parent
family's success, demographers have recently studied and compared
different types of two-parent families. The data from a wide range of
studies shows that not all such families arc alike. Rather, the best
outcomes for children are seen where (1) the parents arc married and
(2) both parents are biologically related to the child. A research brief
by Child Trends sums up the scholarly consensus:
[R]escarch clearly demonstrates that family structure matters
for children, and the family structure that helps them most is a
family headed by two biological parents in a low conflict
marriage. Children in single parent families, children born to
unmarried mothers, and children in step-families or cohabiting

relationships face higher risks of poor outcomes. 102
In seeking to further understand these patterns, sociologists have
compared conventional gold standard two-parent families to a variety
of family combinations in which two opposite-sex adults are present.
These include families in which the parents are unmarried, the
mother is living with a boyfriend unrelated to one or more children,
or the parents are married but the family is "blended": that is, one
biological parent lives with a stepparent who may have been married
previously or have children by another relationship.
Most relevant to the same-sex marriage debate is the data on
different types of blended families. In particular, evidence has
emerged that stepparent families are significantly less beneficial for
children than intact nuclear families. 103 In some studies, blended
families do not produce measurably better child outcomes on a range
of indicators than single parent or cohabiting families.104 As
summarized by two respected demographers, the evidence shows
that these results hold even after controlling for factors such as
"parental education, number of siblings, race, and region."lo5
According to these investigators,
late adolescents and young adults who had grown up with both
biological parents performed better on school achievement tests,
had fewer children as teenagers, finished high school more
often, attended college more often, and were more likely to be

102. Kristin Anderson Moore, et a1., Marriage from a Child's Perspective: How Does
Family Structure Affect Children and What Can We Do About It?, CHILD TRENDS
RESEARCH BRIEF 6 (Jun. 2002).

103. See David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single·Parent
Families in the United Stales Since 1960, in THE fo"trrURE OFTHE FAMILY 28 (Daniel P.
Moynihan et al. eds., 2004) (citing a 1994 study by McLanahan and Sandefur).
104. See id. at 28.
105. Id.
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employed in early adulthood than those who had grown up with
a single parent or a stepparent. 106

Furthermore, although "[c]hildren living with a stepparent ... were
almost as well off economically as children living with two biological
parents."107 they nonetheless were "at least as likely as children who
had lived with a single parent to drop out of high school or to have a
baby before they turned twenty."I08 The authors concluded that "[£]or
adolescents, the economic advantages of having a stepparent seemed
to be offset by psychological disadvantages."I09 In sum, parental
matrimony measurably benefits children, but welfare is most
enhanced when both parents are biologically related to the child.
Two recent papers in the journal Demography buttress these
conclusions. In one, the sociologist Sandra Hofferth undertakes an
analysis of the patterns of school achievement and behavioral
problems for children growing up in a range of two-parent families.llo
Although her analysis is complex-due in part to the number of
family types she examinesll1-a few simple conclusions emerge.
First, her data shows that children growing up in blended familiesthose in which one adult caretaker is biologically unrelated to at
least some of the children-have lower school achievement and more
behavior problems than children growing up in conventional nuclear
families. liZ These differences decline ·but remain significant after
controlling for resource factors like family income, number of
siblings, parental education, and parents' working hours. 113 Although
joint (co·biological) children living with married parents generally do
best on most measures, her data indicates that the co-biological tie to
both parents carries more weight than the parents' marital status.1l4
On tests of academic achievement, for example, she notes that "there
was no significant difference between the scores of children living
with their unmarried biological parents and children living with two
married biological parents."115 In contrast, children living with at
least one non-biological parent (in her sample, usually a step-father)

106.
107.
108.
109.

[d.
ld.
ld_
ld.

110. Sandra E. Hoffert-h, Residential Fath£r Family Type and Child Well-Being:
Investment Versus Selection, 43 DE~lOGRAPHY 53 (2006).
111. These categories include: married biological parents, unmarried biological
parents, biological father and stepmother, biological mother and stepfather. and
biological mother with co-habiting male partner. [d. at 53-75.
112. ld. at 73.
U3.
114.
115.

Td.
ld.
ld. at 63.
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consistently scored lower.1l6 The difficulties experienced by children
living with step-fathers, she observes, suggest "that the biological
relationship of the father matters more than the marital relationship
of the parents."1l7 Indeed, Hofferth found that children living with
their biological father in a blended family (although not with a single
biological father) did virtually as well as those living with both
biological parents. U8 Her conclusion is that, although having two
parents is important. "the achievement story in two-parent families"
stems largely from the pronounced benefits of living with a biological
father. 119
Another Demography piece by Donna Ginther and Robert Pollak
also investigates the effect of family structure on educational
outcomes for children. 120 Like Hofferth, these authors acknowledge
the well-documented disparity in well-being as between "children
who grow up in what the Census Bureau calls 'traditional nuclear
families' (i.e., families in which all children are the joint biological
product of both parents) and children who grow up in other family
structures (i.e., single parent families, blended families)."l2I In
seeking to refine this observation, the authors present data
suggesting that the critical distinction is not "between children who
are reared by both biological parents and children who are not."122
Rather, the author's study suggests that family type is important
regardless of whether the child's two biological parents are present in
the family.123 That is, the evidence indicates that children who grow
up in blended (or stepparent) families-regardless of whether they,
themselves, are the joint biological children of the parents in that
family-do worse than children reared in traditional "non-blended"
nuclear families. 124 Specifically, "outcomes for both types of children
in blended families-stepchildren and their half-siblings who are the
joint children of both parents... are substantially worse than
outcomes for children reared in traditional nuclear families."125
Based on this evidence, families that contain some children who are
unrelated to one parent (which, in their sample-as in Hofferth's-is

116.

Hofferth, supra note 110, at 63.

117.
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120. Donna K. Ginther & Robert A. Pollak, Family Stru,cture and. Children's
Educational Outcomes: Blended FamilU?s. Stylized Facts, and Descriptiue Regressions,
41 DE.,\10GRAPHY 671 (2004).
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usually the father) appear to function less well for all children-even
for those who are the joint products of both parents.
What is the explanation for these observations? Why is the
average blended family less conducive to good outcomes for children?
Why is that effect observed even for joint children of a blended
couple? Additionally, why do demographers find that children who
live apart from a biological father or with an unrelated male do
relatively poorly? The answers are currently a matter of speculation.
Researchers have tried to explain the data by positing selection
effects, ecological effects, and resource effects. On the resource
theory, "family structure may ... be a proxy for ... the allocation of
time and other resources that affect outcomes for cbildren."126
Divorced and remarried parents (and especially fathers) must
sometimes contribute to the care of children or ex-spouses from other
relationships. For this reason, blended families may have less money
at their disposal, and adults (especially males) in those families may
have less time to devote to children. There is some evidence that
resources playa role in the effects seen for blended families, since
controlling for such factors does indeed reduce observed detrimental
effects. That blended families tend to be short on resources cannot be
a complete explanation for the data, however, since significant
shortfalls still remain even when reSOUTces are equalized. 127
Alternative explanations are selection and ecology. In trying to
distinguish these, the question to be answered is "whether men who
are stepfathers or cohabiting partners differ in observed and
unobserved ways from men who raise biological children in a marital
union"?128 It is possible that "those differences rather than something
about the step family or cohabiting family itself," are responsible for
the observed "differences in child achievement and behavior."129 The
idea here is that fathers (and mothers) who end up in blended
families are not representative of the population as a whole. Rather,
they are a "select" group that is perhaps less likely to possess traits
that make them successful family mem1?ers. The attributes that lead
individuals to divorce or start second families may also detract from
those persons' ability to maintain orderly, harmonious, and wellfunctioning families and to rear children effectively. That is, the
disadvantages suffered by children in blended families may reflect
the fact that the parents in those families, on average, tend to be less
well-adjusted. Not only may these parents be less able to negotiate
family relationships, but they may pass the traits responsible for

126.
127.
128.
129.

Ginther & Pollak, supra note 120, at 691.
See Hofferth, supra note 110, at 55-68.
Id. at 54.
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these difficulties on to their children directly through genetic
inheritance as well as environmental conditioning. 130
An explanation that looks to ecological factors, in contrast, is
based on the hypothesis that blended families may function less well
as environments for raising children. There are good reasons,
grounded in social dynamics, to believe that stepparent families
present a less harmonious and orderly child rearing environment
than traditional nuclear families. Lines of authority and loyalty in
blended families are often ambiguous, divided, and vexed. Mothers
may feel torn between their biological children and the demands of
their new partners, whose interest in the children may not match
hers. Alternatively, children may feel little need to respect or obey a
step-father or thei.r mother's male partner, especially if they
maintain a relationship with a biological father who exists outside
the relationship and independently exerts authority over them.
The evidence to date does not clearly distinguish between
selection and ecological explanations for observed patterns. The
observation that blended families produce worse outcomes for
children than conventional nuclear families may point to an
ecological explanation. Blended families may tend to generate a
negative dynamic that affects all children. Alternatively, a selection
effect may be at work. That is, parents in stepparent families may be
less competent or effective parents_ Although it is difficult
empirically to distinguish selection from ecology, there are methods
to help sort out these effects.13I As Pollak and Ginther concede,
however, there is insufficient data to construct a full explanation for
observed differentials in child welfare by family type_ 132
What implications do these demographic observations have for
legalization of same-sex marriage or for legal measures that confer
rights and benefits on same·sex couples generally? Any speculation
rests on the assumption that same-sex parent families will grow in

130. See, e.g., JUDITH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTfON 1 (1998) (noting the
heritability of personality traits and other attributes bearing on adaptive behaviors).
131. One way would be to compare blended step· father families in which the step·
father has neither been married before nor previously fathered a child to families in
which the father has been previously married and divorced, or has cohabited and
fathered a child out of wedlock. If first-marriage step-fathers are not significantly
different from first· marriage fathers generally, an observation that all children of firstmarriage fathers (whether in blended families or not) do equally well, and better than
children in "second relationship" step-father blended families, argues in favor of a
selection hypothesis. On the other hand, if children in conventional nuclear families do
better than children in all types of step-father families (regardless of whether the
father has been married before), this argues for an ecological effect. The possible
confounder here is that men who marry a divorced woman with children-even as a
first marriage-may be a different breed from men who do not.
132. See Ginther & Pollak, supra note 120, at 691-92.
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numbers as same-sex partnerships acquire new legal rights. If this
prediction is borne out, the question is then how this will affect the
well-being of children within those families. Although the briefs in
Lewis u. Harris cited to data suggesting that children are not harmed
by growing up in that setting,133 the sample sizes for existing studies
are too small-and the time-frames too short-to reach definitive
conclusions. Clearly, more and larger studies are needed.
Proponents of same-sex marriage predict that more data will
only vindicate their position. After all, sociologists assure us that
marriage is good for children and adults alike, so legalization will
only expand the circle of those permitted to benefit from this effect.
The problem with this position is that it is too simplistic. The
emerging data on the effects of family form demonstrate that
marriage is not all that matters for children. Indeed, the two studies
discussed above seem to indicate that marriage alone is not what
protects children. Rather, the most advantageous setting combines
parental matrimony with a biological relationship to both parents. It
is the three-way biological bond, cemented by marriage, that
represents the «best practice" for child rearing.
For same-sex families, that three way bond can never be
realized. To the extent that the evidence shows the traditional
nuclear family to be the "gold standard" for family form, same-sex
families must necessarily fall short. But the differences extend
beyond biology. Because the two parents in a same-sex family can
never both be the "real parents," same-sex families' social relations
will often prove as tangled and complicated as those facing
heterosexual blended or post-divorce families-with the lines of
authority and loyalty as murky and confusing, or more so.
To be sure, same-sex couples who choose to create families
through adoption of unrelated children will confront problems that
may not be dissimilar to those facing all adoptive families. Adopted
children are generally at higher risk of learning disabiLities, mental
health problems, and other adverse outcornes. l 34 Selection effects are
thought to make a significant contribution to the problems adopted
children face. Because troubled people are more likely to relinquish
their children, the biological parents of adoptive children may
function less well than average. Adopted children may inherit some
of those difficulties, which would in turn adversely affect their
educational and social success. But these effects will cause all
adopted children to have more problems than biological children
regardless of the familial setting in which they are raised. Whether

133. 908 A.2d at 230 (Long & Zazzali, JJ., concurring).
134. See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, Of Apples and Trees: Adoption and Informed
Consent, 25 QUINNIPlAC L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
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children adopted into same-sex families will be even more troubled
than the general population of adoptees is an open question that can
only be settled through empirical study. There is currently no
evidence on this one way or the other.
Some gay couples choose not to go the conventional adoption
route. Gay couples who decide to bring new children into the world
must confront the ineluctable natural reality: gay sex does not
produce babies. Their children can be biologically related to, at most,
only one member of the pair. The couple must find a biological father
or mother, who will ordinarily be imported from outside the family
unit. That person may be a sperm donor, surrogate mother, former
boyfriend, or just a friend, and may have a same-sex or opposite-sex
partner of his or her own. The existence of this external "third
parent" hovering in the wings potentially introduces complications
not unlike those that af£hct opposite-sex blended families. What is
that person's status? What will be that person's role? How much
authority does he (or she) have over the child? The biological parent
may seek a degree of involvement that is at odds with the
expectations of the same-sex "parental" couple. That person may only
be willing-or permitted-to play an intermediate role in the child's
life. That role may come to clash with the expectations of that child
or other family members. These. complications may give rise to
contentious negotiations, introduce uncertainty and ambiguity, and
erode the involved adults' authority or ability to shape and direct the
child's upbringing.
A recent New York Times Magazine article on same-sex families
illustrates some of these difficulties.I35 That article documents the
complicated and shifting alliances that develop in same-sex families
when biological parents are permitted or denied access, biological
fathers or mothers are cast as supplicants or "friends," and same-sex
partnerships form, dissolve, and re-form.l36 This "crazy circuit board"
of family relations generates equivocal lines of authority and volatile
and uncertain loyalties that may be profoundly unsettling for
children. 137
The emerging data on heterosexual blended families, although
not directly applicable, does not bode well for this brave new world of
complex, extended family relations. To date, the research on child
well-being and family form bears out that children thrive on
structure, order, routine, stability, continuity, certainty, and clarity.
The evidence shows that conventional beats unconventional every
time. This means that the complexities and ambiguities of non-

135.
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traditional families come at a price. By virtue of their biology alone.
same·sex families are more likely to present the risks inherent in
innovative, hybrid family forms. These structures leave children in
doubt about who has authority over them, whom they can rely on.
and who will be there for them.
Although the evidence on opposite-sex families is troubling, the
implications should not be overstated. Data on opposite-sex blended
families cannot settle the question of how the State should approach
the legal status of same-sex partnerships because observations about
heterosexual childrearing do not extrapolate easily into the same-sex
context. There are potentially relevant differences that might
mitigate (or exacerbate) observed effects. In the end, the question of
whether same-sex families are good or bad for children must be
resolved through direct empirical observation. The literature on
blended families does, however, raise red flags and counsel caution.
It also points to questions to be explored and parameters on which
researchers should focus in evaluating same-sex families with
children.
The key observation that emerges from the blended family
literature-and the literature on child development generally-is
that biological ties are important to child well-being. Children do best
if their entire childhood is spent with 'both their biological parents.
Because, as noted, children raised by a same-sex couple cannot be the
biologically realted to both partners, all same-sex families with
children are, in that sense, "blended." Does this mean such families
are doomed to do a worse job than the "gold standard" families?
Consider a family consisting of two gay male partners plus one or
more children who are biologically related to one member of the
couple. The blended family evidence suggests that living with a
biological father is protective. The fact that one partner is the
biological father of a child within the family might enhance the
child's well being. On the other hand, as noted above, the data also
shows that living with an unrelated male puts children at risk, which
may detract from the child's well-being. These effects may balance
each other or one may overwhelm the other. There is no way to
predict this ahead of time.
Any attempt to tease out these effects is complicated by the
numerous permutations that are possible in such families. For
example, a gay male couple family might consist of a child that is the
offspring of one man, plus a child that is the offspring of the other. Or
there may be adopted children mixed in. The possibilities are
endless, which poses a formidable challenge for research design. Or
consider a family consisting of two lesbian women and children who
are biologically related to only one of them. The demographic analogy
to this in the opposite-sex context is not immediately apparent.
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Should these children be compared to those raised in heterosexual
step-father families? Although children in step-father families do not
fare as well as children raised by their two biological parents, their
disadvantages may accrue for reasons that are specific to
heterosexuals. Children raised with step-fathers are deprived of their
biological father, but also live with an unrelated male. Although
children of lesbian couples also lack the advantage of living with a
biological father, an unrelated woman in the home may be more
benign for children than an unrelated man. If that proves to be the
case-and only data will tell----children in lesbian couple homes may
not do as badly as children raised in typical heterosexual blended
families.
Outcomes for children in all these gay-couple situations also
depend on the reason that opposite-sex blended families do worse
than conventional nuclear families. The choice between ecology and
selection has different implications for same-sex parental units. The
dominance of selection effects predicts better outcomes for same-sex
families. By definition, opposite-sex blended families are either the
product of non-marriage or are formed in the aftermath of divorce.
This means that many fathers in these families either have refused
to commit to marriage or have failed at a previous marriage. This
suggests that such fathers may be' less capable than average of
maintaining harmonious relationships or adapting to family living.
There is no reason to believe, however, that the population of gay
men who choose to form families will exemplify these flaws. Indeed,
they may display the opposite traits. These men must deliberately
choose fatherhood and take special steps to realize that goal. Many
are not now married because marriage has not been available to
them. Many would get married if it were, and many of those will be
in first time relationships. In sum, it is possible that the future
population of gay non-biological fathers will be better suited to
fatherhood and domesticity than heterosexual step-fathers. If that is
the case, then "structurally blended" gay male families may end up
being more functional-and producing more favorable outcomes for
children-than opposite-sex blended families.
If, however, the chief defect of opposite-sex blended families is
an ecological one, the story may not be quite as sanguine. How this
factor plays out depends on the logic of the ecological difference,
which is not completely understood. The "stressful" environment in
heterosexual blended families may be due to the asymmetry of the
parents' biological ties, or it may stem from the events, such as a
divorce, that preceded those families' formation. 138 If the risk is
somehow tied to the fact of prior family break-up, and fewer same138.

See Ginther & Pollak, supra note 120, at 691-93.
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sex parents have been through a divorce, then same-sex families
might have better outcomes. If, on the other hand, the asymmetry of
biological connection is key. same-sex families could end up
exemplifying the difficulties observed with opposite-sex blended
families. Similarly, if the existence, presence, or involvement of an
external biological parent sows disruption, then same-sex families
could be just as vulnerable as blended families involving opposite-sex
couples. Without further investigation, these issues cannot be sorted
out.
These observations point to directions for future research. First,
the blended family literature suggests that gay and lesbian couple
families should be analyzed separately, since the dynamics of those
relationships could differ significantly. It is also important to
distinguish between those children who are biologically related to one
parent and those who are unrelated to both. Any research design
should attend to the role, if any, of biological parents who stand
outside the same· sex partnership. Finally, studies should be mindful
of selection effects by carefully controlling for background
characteristics and the life experience of family members.
Investigators must ask whether same-sex parents have produced,
adopted, or raised children with previous partners. If so, are they
still responsible--either financially or personally-for those children?
Have they had significant past relationships and have these
relationships been stable? These distinctions are important for
making appropriate comparisons across the same-sex and opposite
sex divide. Above all, researchers must be mindful that not all
opposite-sex---or same-sex-families are alike. There is significant
heterogeneity within each group that potentially bears on family
success and child welfare. In each case it is important to formulate
the hypothesis to be tested and to specify the counterfactual to which
the families under scrutiny are to be compared.
4

CONCLUSION

This Article assesses recent state court decisions on the right of
homosexuals to marry against the backdrop of two distinct views on
family. For pluralists, recognition and equal rights for homosexual
couples, including the right to many under state law, vindicates core
legal and constitutional values. For traditionalists, extending the
right to marry---or other equivalent prerogatives and incidents-to
same-sex relationships runs contrary to a proper understanding of
the role of marriage in social and moral life. In particular, it fails to
honor the centrality to marriage of childrearing and the socialization
of future generations. Traditionalists believe that function is best
performed within conventional, opposite-sex nuclear families_
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Traditional forms and practices are often difficult to justify on
social scientific grounds. There is some modest support, however, for
traditionalist wariness towards same-sex marriage. That wariness is
grounded in the very concerns with same-sex families as an
environment for rearing children that the New Jersey Supreme
Court set aside in Lewis u. Harris. What we know about the
relationship between family form and child well-being suggests that
children raised in same-sex families-which, by definition, are
"blended"-might not do as well in the long run as children raised by
their joint biological, married parents. These speculations await the
results of empirical investigation.
Even if these predictions prove true. however, facts are not
values. Data on social outcomes never tell us what to do about them.
Same-sex relationships represent a brave new world of novel
families, dynamics, combinations, and ecology. Caution concerning
such arrangements and their effects-and attention to the well-being
of children within them-is the wise course of a decent society. But
enhanced risks for children, especially if modest, may not warrant
abandoning reforms motivated by a firm commitment to rights and
equality_ Although we may choose to balance costs and benefits, it is
important to strike that balance with full information.

